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THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS  Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2017) 
APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
THEN AND NOW* 
Yves-Marie Morissette** 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.***
I. THE EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW OVER TIME
A. The Slow Emergence of Appeals at Common Law 
For a range of historical reasons,1 it took a long time for 
appellate procedures to develop in the common law world—
*© 2016 Yves-Marie Morissette. This article is based on a paper presented in January 2016 
in Toronto at an Appellate Courts Seminar organized by the National Judicial Institute 
(NJI) of Canada. It is derived in part from the Wainwright Memorial Lecture delivered in 
the Faculty of Law of McGill University in October 2012, and which is now published as 
Yves-Marie Morissette, Aspects historiques et analytiques de l’appel en matière civile, 59 
MCGILL L.J. 481 (2014) [hereinafter Wainwright Lecture]. I thank my law clerk, Jean-
Philippe MacKay, for his assistance while the paper for the NJI was in preparation.  
**Judge, Court of Appeal of Quebec. 
***William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY
923 (Alexander W. Allison et al. eds., rev. ed. 1975). 
1. Several factors combined to delay the emergence of a modern appellate process in 
the English common law tradition. The most influential of these factors probably were (i) 
the prevalence of jury trials at common law (the absence of written reasons hampers 
review); (ii) the early appearance of writs issued by the Royal Courts (the writ of attaint, 
the writ of error, the writ of false judgment, the writ of certiorari and even the writ of 
habeas corpus) which, to a variable extent fulfilled a function analogous to appeals (Why 
bother with appeals when we already catch errors with writs?); and (iii) the early but by all 
accounts chaotic development of appeals to the Chancellor in Chancery. (On the chaotic 
state of Chancery, see 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH ET AL., HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 437–
42 (1956) (addressing this turmoil in sections called “[t]he inadequacy of the judicial staff” 
and “[t]he abuses rampant amongst the official staff”). It is entertaining, to say the least.) In 
their essay Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, Professors Dyzenhaus and Taggart 
explain why the giving of reasons—without which appeals are difficult—was a very late 
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thus, in England, the modern appellate process only dates back 
to the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.2 By contrast, appeals to 
intermediate courts already existed in France and in other 
continental European countries as early as the thirteenth 
century.3
feature of the common law tradition. David Dyzenhaus & Douglas Taggart,  Reasoned 
Decisions and Legal Theory, in Douglas E. Edlin, Common Law Theory 134, 143–44 
(2007) (“Recall Lord Mansfield’s (in)famous advice to a colonial governor in 1790: 
‘Consider what you think justice requires, and decide accordingly. But never give your 
reasons; for your judgment will probably be right; but your reasons will certainly be 
wrong.’”). The fact that substantive law was essentially judge-made, un-codified (and for a 
long time unprinted) must also have exacerbated these factors. See H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 240–45 (4th ed. 
2010).
2. Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77; Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. I 
say the “modern” appellate process because there had existed at various points in the 
distant past different mechanisms (often quite convoluted or strange to modern eyes) for 
the review or reconsideration of judgments. In his excellent biography of William Murray, 
Professor Poser writes that  
[t]he three central courts not only tried cases but also heard appeals. This they 
did in an interlocking manner. Appeals from King’s Bench went to the 
Exchequer Chamber, composed of the judges of Common Pleas and Exchequer, 
or directly to the House of Lords; appeals from Common Pleas went to King’s 
Bench; and appeals from Exchequer went to Exchequer Chamber, which in such 
cases was composed of judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas. 
NORMAN S. POSER, LORD MANSFIELD: JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF REASON 202 (2013). As a 
hereditary peer, Lord Mansfield, “sitting as a member of the House of Lords, . . . might 
play a role in deciding an appeal of a case on which he had sat as the trial judge,” 
something which the Earl of Shelburne thought “most indecent.” Id.
3.  There can be no question that the French law of appeals developed quite early, as 
[l]es réformes de Saint-Louis—supprimant le duel judiciaire dans le domaine 
royal (1254 et 1258)—firent de l’appel l’instrument majeur des progrès de la 
justice royale. Le Parlement, progressivement séparé de la personne du roi, reçut 
un afflux d’appels des juridictions seigneuriales et des juges royaux comme les 
baillis. En empruntant de nombreuses règles au droit romain par l’intermédiaire 
des pratiques méridionales, le style du parlement précisa au XIVe s. les 
décisions susceptibles d’appel, le délai de dix jours après la sentence, l’amende 
de fol appel, ainsi que toutes les formes requises pour « ajourner » les juges 
inférieurs et « intimer » l’autre partie. 
Louis Halpérin, Recours (Voies de), in DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE 
1307 (Denis Alland & Stephane Rials eds., 2003) (indicating that the appeal became an 
important instrument of royal justice, that appeals to Parliament came to replace appeals to 
the king, and that French law borrowed the notion of appeal and some of its procedures and 
structures from Roman law). Elsewhere in continental Europe, the reception of Romano-
Canonical law accounts for the early development of appeals, for “[o]ne of the main 
features of canon law is the procedure of appeal, i.e., the review of the judgment of a lower 
by a higher court, which for reasons of law or of fact, can consider the lower judgment 
wrong and replace it by a better one.” R.C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil 
Procedure in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2-18 
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What is more interesting, however, is an aspect of the 
origin of appeals shared by both the civil law and the common 
law traditions: the slow shift from denouncing the person of the 
judge to challenging the judge’s error(s). Both traditions also 
have another characteristic in common: the notion of reviewable 
error changed through the centuries in a manner which reflected 
the dominant legal and political ideas of the times. In a sense, 
what we have here is a fragment of intellectual history, though 
admittedly a modest one. 
B. Denouncing the Judge or Challenging the Judge’s Error(s)? 
Commenting on this aspect of legal history, Sir Frederick 
Pollock and F.W. Maitland write that “[t]he idea of a complaint 
against a judgment which is not an accusation against the judge 
is not easily formed.”4 And indeed, for several centuries in 
England, whenever a jury of twenty-four members was satisfied 
that an earlier jury of twelve members had returned a false 
verdict, the members of the first jury faced severe punishment 
for the betrayal of their oath of office. The writ of attaint, only 
abolished in 1825, made them liable to imprisonment and 
confiscation of their chattels. 
Similarly, in France, judges who rendered “erroneous” 
judgments could be challenged with the procedure of faussement
which was directed against them personally and put them 
personally at risk. Montesquieu devotes several interesting pages 
to faussement in De l’esprit des lois.5
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that, in an ancient 
(archaic?) constitutional environment, based for a long time on 
the divine-right theory of kings, errors, fallacies, or other 
perceived mistakes by officials or jurymen empowered to render 
justice on behalf of the king were seen as perverse, a mixture of 
(Mauro Cappelletti, chief ed. 1987); see also id. at 2-32–2-40 (describing the impact of 
Romano-Canonical law in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, England (in Chancery 
only), the Low Countries, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Scotland, and Switzerland). 
4. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I at 665 (2d ed. 1895). 
5. 2 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS, bk. 28, ch. 22–33 
(Garnier Frères 1961) (1748). The role of juries was, of course, far less important in old 
French law than in English law. That probably accounts for the fact that judges, not juries, 
were the prime targets of these review processes. 
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blasphemy and treachery (a forfaiture in French), and deserving 
of serious sanctions. 
C. The Mutations and Long Maturation of the Notion of Error 
From a historical perspective, what is especially revealing 
is the maturation over time of the very idea of reviewable or 
reversible error. Here too, we find many similarities, and some 
sharp differences, between the laws of England and those of 
continental Europe. But in both traditions, during this protracted 
evolution, each distinct period coincided with a different notion 
of error. And as each period receded into the past, a shift 
occurred in the understanding of what qualify as findings of fact 
or of law warranting review. 
During the late Middle Ages, an era when the sacred and 
the secular were still closely intertwined, the prevailing notions 
are often hard to fathom by today’s standard—they bring to 
mind theological disputations and controversies. And they 
differ, markedly, from the idea of error we see arising with the 
Reformation6 or, soon after, with the Enlightenment, but more 
about this anon. 
The utilitarian notion of error, which really blossomed 
during the Industrial Revolution, first appeared at the time of 
Bentham and probably peaked at the time of Langdell. We may 
call it the positivist or modern idea of error, which still has real 
traction today. But, soon enough in the twentieth century, with 
Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn and the American legal realists 
on one side, and theorists such as Hans Kelsen or H.L.A. Hart 
on the other, another concept of error would begin to take shape. 
I believe it remains the current (or post-modern, if one wishes to 
be slightly controversial) concept. In other words, this is where 
we still are now. I shall try to illustrate, briefly, the last stages of 
this evolution. But let me begin with an earlier shift. 
6. Would dissents have been possible without the Reformation? How can there be 
dissents when the search for a Platonic truth is thought to be the sole point of the exercise? 
As a general proposition, the common law tends to be Aristotelian, the civil law Platonic. 
Quiet, de facto dissents certainly exist in continental European jurisdictions, but they are 
never published or brought to light because they are forbidden. In appellate jurisdictions 
such as the Conseil d’État in France, insiders (i.e., judges) are of course well aware of 
minority views expressed among themselves during deliberations, but these are not shared 
with outsiders (i.e., litigants, counsel, and the general public) in the reasons for judgment.  
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D. A Harbinger of the Enlightenment: 
Bushell’s Case and Pluralities of Opinions 
One elegant and truly striking indication of such a shift is 
found in Bushell’s Case, decided in 1670.7 It involved William 
Penn, the son of a famous admiral and, at that time, a Quaker of 
twenty-six. He would later illustrate himself in America as the 
founder of Pennsylvania. Penn and his friend William Mead had 
been prosecuted for “unlawful congregating and assemblies.”8
Despite implacable directions by the presiding judge, the jury 
acquitted them. As a result, the jurymen were imprisoned, but 
one of them, Bushell, sought a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Court of Common Pleas. The case came before a bench presided 
over by Sir John Vaughan, who delivered the unanimous 
judgment in terms which are astonishingly modern,9 and which, 
as it happened, caused the writ of attaint to fall into disuse long 
before its actual statutory abolition in 1825. 
Bushell was decided many years before the appearance of 
the Judicature Act 1873, at a time when reviewing courts (other 
7. Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 E.R. 1006 (1670).  
8. Id. at 135. 
9. Upon the return of the writ, Vaughan concluded that there had been “no cause of fine 
or imprisonment” against Bushell and his eleven fellow jurymen: 
I would know whether any thing be more common, than for two men students, 
barristers, or Judges, to deduce contrary and opposite conclusions out of the 
same case in law? And is there any difference that the two men should infer 
distinct conclusions from the same testimony: Is any thing more known than that 
the same author, and place in that author, is forcibly urg’d to maintain contrary 
conclusions, and the decision hard, which is in the right? Is any thing more 
frequent in the controversies of religion, than to press the same text for opposite 
tenents? How then comes it to pass that two persons may not apprehend with 
reason and honesty, what a witness, or many, say, to prove in the understanding 
of one plainly one thing, but in the apprehension of the other, clearly the 
contrary thing: must therefore one of these merit fine and imprisonment, because 
he doth that which he cannot otherwise do, preserving his oath and integrity? 
And this often is the case of the Judge and jury. . . . And by the way I must here 
note, that the verdict of a jury, and the evidence of a witness are very different 
things, in the truth and falsehood of them: a witness swears but to what he hath 
heard or seen, generally or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses. 
But a jury-man swears to what he can inferr and conclude from the testimony of 
such witnesses, by the act and force of his understanding, to be the fact inquired 
after, which differs nothing in the reason, though much in the punishment, from 
what a Judge, out of various cases consider’d by him, inferrs to be the law in the 
question before him. 
Id. at 141–42 or 1009. 
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than the Chancellor’s Court) operated primarily with prerogative 
writs—habeas corpus in this instance. But writ-driven judicial 
review obviously prefigured what would eventually become 
judicial review and appeals. More to the point, the tone of this 
remarkable judgment, rendered at a time when Locke, Newton, 
and Spinoza were at work, and when the Enlightenment was 
right over the horizon, is a potent harbinger of what was about to 
emerge. It is not clear to me that Vaughan’s brand of thinking 
would have been possible before the Reformation. It certainly 
departed from what could be labelled theological10 thinking 
about law and I doubt it would ever have been tolerated under 
Canon Law in the Vatican. 
The great master of this period, of course, was Lord 
Mansfield, who sat as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s 
Bench from 1756 to 1788. He was steeped in Roman law, civil 
law, and the lex merchant of the time, and his lifespan coincides 
almost exactly with what we call the Age of Enlightenment. It is 
an era of fierce public debate, marked by major, judge-made 
changes in the law, most in the name of Reason. Quite apart 
from a number of causes célèbres11 that he heard and decided, 
Mansfield today is remembered primarily for his general and 
long-lasting influence on the orderly development of the 
common law.12
10. Or, if one prefers, dogmatic. 
11. Thus, he held that general warrants were illegal, Money v. Leach, 97 E.R. 1075 
(1765), reversed the declaration of outlawry against the seditious libeller John Wilkes, R. v. 
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (1770), and by his own estimation, see POSER, supra note 2, at 295, 
set some 14,000 to 15,000 slaves free as a result of his celebrated judgment in Somerset v. 
Stewart, 98 E.R. 499 (1772). 
12. On Mansfield’s legacy, one scholar writes that 
[m]ore than two hundred and fifty years after he became a judge, Lord 
Mansfield remains a dominant presence, not just to legal scholars but also to 
judges and lawyers in Britain, the United States, Canada, and other nations that 
follow the Anglo-American legal tradition. Every year, his decisions and 
pronouncements are cited as relevant to present-day conditions (or in some cases 
explicitly rejected because they are no longer relevant). Courts and governments 
around the globe continue to learn from Mansfield’s wisdom. 
POSER, supra note 2, at 396. Prefacing a captivating biography of Judge Henry Friendly, 
no less a judge than Richard Posner describes Friendly as “the best federal appellate judge 
of the past half century.” DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS 
ERA xi (2012).  Dorsen considers Friendly’s legacy, noting that 
[a]s much as any twentieth-century American jurist, Friendly was in the tradition 
of Lord Mansfield, whose innovative thinking moved England’s legal doctrines 
closer to the demands of a commercial reformation. Two centuries after 
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E. “Error” According to Nineteenth-Century 
Rationalists and Positivists
The nineteenth century is the time when the law, looking 
back at itself, believes that it is working itself pure. It thinks of 
itself as a discipline about to rival the natural sciences in terms 
of accuracy and predictability of results. In some measure, this is 
a consequence of Jeremy Bentham’s influence: he believed that 
laws should always be “rational”13 and that they should all be 
codified.14 Characteristically, he is said to have written that “‘I 
think therefore I am’ is the argument of Descartes, ‘I am 
therefore I do not have to think’ is the argument of the common 
law.”15 He was a major philosopher, to be sure, but his 
intellectual influence may also at times have been little short of 
nefarious.
This is the century of the Industrial Revolution, and of 
scientism (a word whose first recorded use, according to the 
OED, is in 187016), it is the era of Albert Venn Dicey’s account 
of the law of the constitution,17 as well as Halsbury’s Laws of 
England and Halsbury’s Statutes,18 the period during which we 
Mansfield, Friendly’s open, analytical, and practical mind led him to create 
constructive and even novel solutions to a rapidly growing economy. 
Id. at 350 (footnote omitted). 
13. There can be no doubt that, as time passed, the pursuit of rationality became easier 
because of a host of reasons both endogenous and exogenous to law: the advent and growth 
of accurate case reporting, the decline of civil juries coinciding with the rise of judgment 
writing by judges in civil cases, the invention and dissemination of printing, the spread of 
literacy, and the like. 
14. It is he who coined the word “codification” in English. CHARLES WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 513 (1911) (describing Bentham as “the inventor of the 
words, ‘codify,’ and ‘codification’”). 
15. This quotation may be apocryphal (I have never been able to trace it) but I distinctly 
remember from my student days in England that a distinguished legal academic used it 
verbatim in a lecture. It is, at any rate, quite consistent with Bentham’s distaste for many 
common law rules and institutions. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right 
Answers, 74 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 355, 355 (1999) (quoting an 1811 letter from Bentham to 
President James Madison in which he characterizes the common law as a “yoke . . . about 
[the] necks” of Madison and his compatriots). 
16. See Scientism, OED.COM, http://0-www.oed.com/ (tracing word origin to 1870). 
17. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1885).
18. HALSBURY ET AL., THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BEING A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF 
THE WHOLE LAW OF ENGLAND (1907);  HALSBURY ET AL., THE COMPLETE STATUTES OF 
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see a rise and hardening of stare decisis as a decisionmaking 
rule. It is also the golden of age the declaratory theory of the 
common law.19 It is an age of exactness and formalism, 
characterised by a quest for certainty, an era of picking gnats 
with tweezers in the hope, after Darwin, that minutiae will 
reveal to us why the law should remain static or how it should 
occasionally evolve. 
Much later than Bentham, but on a parallel course, the 
American Christopher Columbus Langdell invented his own 
science of the common law at Harvard Law School. He may not 
have been the pathetic dunce that Grant Gilmore depicts in his 
entertaining Storrs Lectures, in which he speaks of this period as 
the Age of Faith.20 There can be little doubt, however, that had 
Langdell been an appellate judge, nothing would have found 
favour in his eyes that did not coincide exactly with his own 
views on any issue; everything else would have warranted 
reversal as clearly wrong. 
The culmination of this vision of law is an environment in 
which the quest for the one and only right answer provides a 
singleness of purpose for all pursuits, intellectual or 
professional. In such an environment, virtually any disagreement 
with the findings of a lower jurisdiction, whether of law or of 
fact, justifies reversal. The costs of appellate litigation and the 
ENGLAND CLASSIFIED AND ANNOTATED IN CONTINUATION OF HALSBURY’S LAWS OF 
ENGLAND (1929).
19. The theory goes back to Blackstone’s Commentaries, which first appeared in 1766. 
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND [69] (1852) 
(asserting that “the law in [a] case being solemnly declared and determined, what before 
was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which is not in the 
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he 
being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the 
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to 
maintain and expound the old one”). Lord Reid called it a “fairy tale.” Reid, The Judge as 
Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y OF PUB. TEACHERS OF L. (NEW SERIES) 22, 22 (1972). 
20. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, 38–43 (2d ed. 2014). Gilmore 
writes that “Langdell seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life, 
hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of a genius.” Id. at 
38. In fact, Langdell was an innovator, and modern legal education in universities is much 
in his debt. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL 1826–1906 (2009). But he most decidedly 
was of the view that, to every legal question, there is one and only one right answer, 
discoverable by scientific enquiry, the law library and law reports being the laboratory and 
instruments of lawyers. 
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complexities of procedure21 are the factors that restrict the scope 
of appellate review—in other words, not some self-imposed 
concept of deference or self-restraint (or of futility of 
reconsideration), but red tape and steep transaction costs in 
litigation. 
By the mid-twentieth century in the United States, and later 
in England but never there as decisively as in the United States, 
this Age of Faith would come to something of an end. In 
England, strict adherence to precedent remained an article of 
faith well into the 1960s. Lord Simonds presided over a period 
of “substantive formalism,” as Robert Stevens calls it,22 which 
marked the final phase of a conception of law and adjudication 
that had appeared well over a century earlier. Thus, 
Lord Simonds as senior Law Lord ensured that “justice as 
certainty” prevailed in the House of Lords since most of the  
Law Lords generally favoured precedent to principle, 
refining rather than rationalising the law, and applying the 
law as it was, not as they might wish it to be. Law reform 
was for the legislature.23
Substantive formalism constituted the apotheosis of the 
declaratory theory. 
F. “Error” According to Twentieth Century 
Skeptics and Realists 
Next, the First and the Second World Wars, the Great 
Depression, much upheaval, and a range of other societal factors 
ushered in what Gilmore calls the Age of Anxiety.24 (The Age of 
Scepticism would be as accurate a description, in my view.) The 
first clear sign, according to him, was the reaction to the 
21. This is not yet the era of access to justice. Dickens’s Bleak House offers an image of 
how things worked that is not merely a caricature. 
22. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL 
BODY 1800–1976, at 326–35 (1979) (discussing Lord Simonds’s career in the context of a 
“politics of substantive formalism”).  
23. ALAN PATERSON, FINAL JUDGMENT: THE LAST LAW LORDS AND THE SUPREME
COURT 255 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
24. See generally GILMORE, supra note 20, at 61–88.  
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publication of Benjamin Cardozo’s Storrs Lectures, delivered at 
Yale in 1920.25 Gilmore explains: 
Our dawning Age of Anxiety is perfectly symbolized by 
the mysterious—the almost mystical—figure of Benjamin 
Nathan Cardozo. . . . The thing that is hardest to understand 
about The Nature of the Judicial Process is the furor which 
its publication caused. Nothing can better illustrate the 
extraordinary hold which the Langdellian concept of law 
had acquired, not only on the legal but on the popular 
mind.26
In less than one generation, the Langdellian model of legal 
reasoning would lose much of its appeal, in large measure 
because of the emergence of a new and powerful jurisprudential 
school, known as American legal realism. Unlike Langdellian 
jurisprudence, it is not at all monolithic, and indeed to call it a 
school may be a bit of a misnomer. Two of its most influential 
members, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn, took a special 
interest in appellate processes and caselaw. Each wrote an 
impressive monograph on the subject27 in which he gives an 
account of judicial decisionmaking which marks a clear 
departure from Langdellian views about precedents and “right 
answers.” I have elsewhere devoted some sixteen pages to a 
detailed discussion of Llewellyn’s thesis, under the title 
L’élaboration et l’ordonnancement du droit par l’appel.28 I will 
therefore not delve into the question here. Suffice it to say that 
Llewellyn’s concept of judicial decisionmaking presents the role 
of appellate courts as one of preserving the systemic coherence 
of the law, and especially judge-made law, rather than one of 
reviewing for error all lower-court judgments which could be 
considered defective in a Langdellian sense. The essay includes 
25. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). But, as 
Lon Fuller observed, “Cardozo did not follow the example of those who make relativism 
itself an absolute.” Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 
377 (1946). 
26. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 67, 69 (footnote omitted).
27. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); 
ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941). Of the two books, 
Llewellyn’s is the more challenging. Pound and Llewellyn held many of the same views, 
however. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997). 
28. Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 532–48.
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what can be described, I think without exaggeration, as an 
onslaught on the one-single-answer doctrine dear to Langdell. 
And implicit in this view, or perhaps even explicit at times, is a 
concept of interpretive pluralism which we have seen at work in 
Canadian administrative law for over thirty-five years. 
Change in English law came later, was more laborious and 
apparently not as pronounced. In 1962, Viscount (formerly 
Lord) Simonds retired from the House of Lords, where he had 
been first appointed in 1944 and had served as Lord Chancellor 
between 1951 and 1954. Two years later, under a Labour 
government, Lord Gardiner became Lord Chancellor. His role in 
the adoption of the (rather extraordinary) 1966 Practice
Statement29 on precedent in the House of Lords is fully 
documented in a Paterson monograph30 and it makes for 
fascinating reading. Quite clearly, a new concept of precedent 
and of stare decisis was taking shape. English law was never as 
permeable to the ideas of American legal realism as was 
Canadian law and this is well apparent in administrative law.31
There are signs of change, however, and of a partial 
incorporation of realist ideas. Thus, I would argue that what the 
House of Lords did, heroically, some sixteen years ago in 
Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln City Council32 is such a sign, and a 
strong one too, of a shift in paradigm: the House practically 
abandoned the declaratory theory of the common law, whose 
apotheosis, as we saw, was substantive formalism. 
A recent monograph33 by Judge Posner (his sixty-fourth 
title, according to a review in the Harvard Magazine34) is 
29. [1966] 3 All E.R. 77 (characterizing precedent as “an indispensable foundation 
upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases,” but also 
recognizing that “too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case 
and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law”). 
30. ALAN PATTERSON, LAW LORDS: HOW BRITAIN’S TOP JUDGES SEE THEIR ROLE
149–51 (1982).
31. More on this later. See infra note 45. 
32. [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (acknowledging that “[t]he whole of the common law is judge-
made and only by judicial change in the law is the common law kept relevant in a changing 
world,” and that “a judgment overruling an earlier decision is bound to operate to some 
extent retrospectively” because it will apply “to all cases subsequently coming before the 
courts,” even those in which the relevant actions took place before the change in the law). 
33. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY
(2016).
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certainly the most current, and possibly the most eloquent, 
account of what legal realism may mean today in appellate 
judging. It is true that Judge Posner carefully eschews the label 
legal realist for himself. As he points out, the use of this 
expression in academic circles still occasionally conveys a 
disagreeable nuance of cynicism towards legal reasoning. (I 
would have said that the realists were uncomfortably lucid rather 
than cynical but Judge Posner does make a plausible point here.) 
He quickly adds, however, that “[r]ealism is equivalent to 
pragmatism in the lay, not philosophical, sense of the word” and 
he describes himself as a pragmatist.35 His critique (at times 
hilarious, and no doubt deliberately so) of originalism as an 
avatar of formalism, of conventional canons of statutory 
interpretation that yield no clear answer, of convoluted legal 
reasoning dressed up as logico-deductive analysis, of un-
weighted multifactor tests that confuse rather than clarify 
judicial decisionmaking, of blinkered and ill-informed legal 
arguments that miss the essential (often economic) realities of 
particular disputes, and indeed his very critique of standards of 
review on appeal, all ring refreshingly candid and true.36
The distinctions or clarifications a Canadian judge might 
wish to add are of no real account here. Judge Posner could be 
critical of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., but he never concealed 
his admiration for Holmes the judge and Holmes the realist.37
More than once, his latest book brings to mind the lucid and 
lapidary style of Justice Holmes, as when Judge Posner writes: 
34. Lincoln Caplan, Rhetoric and Law: The Double Life of Richard Posner, America’s 
Most Contentious Legal Reformer, HARV. MAGAZINE, Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 49, available at
http://harvardmagazine.com/2015/12/rhetoric-and-law. 
35. POSNER, supra note 33, at 79.  
36. Id. at 83–88, 101–07, 117–20, 126–32. 
37. It is Justice Holmes, after all, who wrote, “We must think things not words, or at 
least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to 
keep to the real and the true.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in 
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899). Judge Posner reproduced this entire article in 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS,
SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
(1997). Holmes shared the view expressed in it with his colleague Justice Brandeis, who, 
dissenting with Justice Holmes in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), which was 
overruled in part on other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941), 
observed that “in the case at bar, also, the logic of words should yield to the logic of 
realities.” Id. at 43 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). 
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 38 Side A      11/15/2017   09:50:50
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 38 Side A      11/15/2017   09:50:50
MORISSETTEEXECEDIT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2017 6:49 PM
STANDARDS OF REVIEW THEN AND NOW 67
“All this is implicit in the emphasis I have placed on the 
indeterminacy of law, the fact that it is not a science or even a 
social science, that it is a kind of groping.”38 Indeed, let us grope 
along, in as well-informed a way as we can manage under the 
circumstances, but let us not delude ourselves about what we are 
doing.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW HERE AND NOW
A. The Fundamental Distinction Between Judicial Review 
and Appeals 
Standards of review in administrative law (or what we 
commonly call “judicial review” in the narrow sense) were once 
a hotly debated issue. Subject to a few qualifications I mention 
below, they are much less controversial today. The starting point 
of modern public law in this country is the foundational 
precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Union 
of Public Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation,39 a 
case whose immense significance I frequently underscored in 
law review articles40 as well as in judgments.41 The pivotal 
importance of this case was reaffirmed in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,42 the other landmark decision in the field. Between 
those two cases, and after Dunsmuir, there were dozens of other 
judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada which enriched our 
understanding of judicial review43 and there were also, of 
38. POSNER, supra note 33, at 227. 
39. [1979] 2 S.C.R 227 (C.U.P.E.). 
40. See in particular, in the aftermath of Dunsmuir, Yves-Marie Morissette, 
Rétrospective et prospective sur le contentieux administratif, 39 R.D.U.S. 1 (2008–2009). 
41. See, e.g., Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail c. Société Terminaux 
Montréal Gateway, 2015 QCCA 542 (Que. Ct. App.); Comité exécutif de l’Ordre des 
ingénieurs du Québec c. Roy, [2011] R.J.Q. 1700, 2011 QCCA 1707 (Que. Ct. App.); RCI 
Environnement inc. c. Commission des transports du Québec, [2007] R.J.Q. 1152, 2007 
QCCA 666 (Que. Ct. App.); Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail c. Fontaine, 
[2005] R.J.Q. 2203, 2005 QCCA 775 (Que. Ct. App.). 
42. [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9. 
43. See, e.g., Canadian Broad. Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., [2015] 3 S.C.R. 615, 2015 
SCC 57; Sask. (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, 2013 SCC 11; 
Alta. (Information and Privacy Comm’r) v. Alta. Teachers’ Ass’n, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, 
2011 SCC 61; Can. (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2009 
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course, a few instances in which the Court misfired, sometimes 
badly so.44 Out of this corpus grew a doctrine of deference 
towards tribunals and other administrative decisionmakers 
which inspired a great deal of academic commentary.45
This theory or doctrine of deference, also sometimes 
referred to as interpretive pluralism, is a home-grown 
development: when C.U.P.E. was decided, in 1979, Canadian 
administrative law began to part ways with English 
administrative law.46 In my view, the doctrine came into 
existence in North America because of the impact of American 
legal realism on legal scholarship, legal thinking, and, in 
particular, judicial thinking.47 It remains currently the prevailing 
approach to judicial review, even though there are occasional 
SCC 12; B.C. Tel. Co. v. Shaw Cable Sys. (BC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739; Domtar v. Que. 
(Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756.  
44. One disastrous example, in my humble opinion, is the judgment in Union des 
employés de services, local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, decided unanimously 
after twenty-six months of deliberations, by a panel of four judges (three of the original 
seven, Judges Estey, Chouinard, and LeDain, having respectively retired, died, and become 
incapacitated during the process). It is now mercifully defunct as a result of Dunsmuir.
45. See, e.g., PAUL DALY, A THEORY OF DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIS,
APPLICATION AND SCOPE (2012). 
46. As a result of Lord Diplock’s judgment in O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 
English judges generally show no deference to administrative decisionmakers on questions 
of law; there is a presumption that the law is for the judge. Anisminic v. Foreign Comp. 
Comm’n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 167 sowed the seed, noting that “it is for the courts to 
interpret the statute, by which an inferior tribunal is given jurisdiction, to see whether it 
acted within it.” See also R. v. Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page, [1993] A.C. 682, 692 
(explaining that “bodies other than courts, in so far as they are required to apply the law . . . 
are required to apply the law correctly,” and that “[i]f they apply the law incorrectly they 
have not performed their duty correctly and judicial review is available to correct their 
error of law so that they may make their decision upon a proper understanding of the law”); 
Boddington v. British Transp. Police, [1999] 2 A.C. 143. 
According to Professor Endicott, this is the result of a distortion of what the House 
of Lords in Anisminic actually meant. It ruled that an error of law that leads the public 
authority to step outside its jurisdiction results in a nullity that is fully reviewable. 
TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 303 (2009). “Yet the Law Lords went 
on in later cases to invent a rule that it is unlawful for a public authority to make a decision 
based on any error of law. One remarkable feature of the novel doctrine is the way in 
which it arose from a myth about Anisminic.” Id.
47. The doctrine does have obvious affinities, however, with a parallel doctrine in the 
United States. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2017); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 511 DUKE L.J. 511 
(1989).
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signs of departure from this received doctrine. The most 
troubling one in recent times is an emerging tendency to favour 
a segmentation of tribunals’ decisions, which has the potential of 
dragging us down a slippery slope towards the review for 
correctness of all questions of law.48 The received doctrine may 
yet undergo significant metamorphoses, as might happen as a 
result of a case recently heard in the Supreme Court of Canada; 
the case reignited an old controversy about the review of 
persistently contradictory decisions by tribunals acting within 
their jurisdiction.49 This said, the doctrine of deference is not the 
48. Dissenting in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, 
2015 SCC 16, Justice Abella wrote: 
My final concern is a practical one. What do we tell reviewing courts to do when 
they segment a tribunal decision and subject each segment to different standards 
of review only to find that those reviews yield incompatible conclusions? How 
many components found to be reasonable or correct will it take to trump those 
found to be unreasonable or incorrect? Can an overall finding of reasonableness 
or correctness ever be justified if one of the components has been found to be 
unreasonable or incorrect? If we keep pulling on the various strands, we may 
eventually find that a principled and sustainable foundation for reviewing 
tribunal decisions has disappeared. And then we will have thrown 
out Dunsmuir’s baby with the bathwater. 
Id. at ¶ 173. 
 Earlier that year, in Tervita Corporation v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition),
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 161, 2015 SCC 3, Justice Abella had concurred in the result but had 
rejected the standard of correctness as inapplicable and opted instead for a reasonableness 
standard. Id. at ¶ 171. In SODRAC, also decided in 2015, she dissented for the same reason. 
Justice Rothstein, writing for the majority in that case, offered the following rejoinder, 
Justice Abella objects to the segmentation of issues for the purpose of standard 
of review analysis and to the confusion she says this causes. This is the same 
objection she raised in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 
S.C.R. 3, 2015 SCC 16, a decision issued by this Court in April 2015. Saguenay 
is the controlling authority and, on the issue of standard of review, these reasons 
apply Saguenay.
Id. at ¶ 41. If Saguenay does carry this kind of weight, it will be difficult not to fall back 
into the logic of cases such as Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. International 
Union of Operating Engineers Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425, itself based on Anisminic, but 
that is precisely what C.U.P.E. was meant to correct. One court of appeal appears to share 
this view of Saguenay. See Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2015 ABCA 225 (Alta. Ct. 
App.) Two of my colleagues and I took a different view in Commission des droits de la 
personne et de la jeunesse c. Côté, 2015 QCCA 1544 (Que. Ct. App.). 
49. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Can. Ltd., 2016 SCC 29, 2016 CSC 29; see also
Atomic Energy of Can. Ltd. v. Wilson, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 467, 2015 FCA 17 (Stratas, J.A., 
for the Court), rev’d, 2016 SCC 29, 2016 CSC 29. Justice Stratas’s reasons are of particular 
interest here. See id. at ¶¶ 52–56 (describing “persistent discord” among specialized 
tribunals, expressing concern that decisions have “depended on the identity of the 
adjudicator” and opining that Dunsmuir indicates that rule-of-law considerations require 
court to intervene “by giving its view of the correct answer”). Many years ago, I argued 
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dominant paradigm in areas other than administrative law.50 In 
that sense, appeals still differ from judicial review, unless of 
course the object of the appeal is a judgment in judicial review. 
Outside the confines of administrative law, other appellate 
standards of review apply. These are not entirely dissimilar from 
those applicable to judicial review, for a common notion of 
reasonableness or, more accurately, unreasonableness, pervades 
both judicial review and appeals. An excellent monograph on 
the topic, now in its second edition,51 does not take into account 
Dunsmuir and ulterior developments, but it remains perhaps the 
most thorough study of the subject and a safe guide on appellate 
standards.52
For my present purposes, I will offer a simpler account of 
standards and focus on what is to me the most crucial distinction 
that, according to one concept of the rule of law, review was warranted in cases of 
persistent inconsistencies. Yves-Marie Morissette, Le contrôle de la compétence 
d’attribution: thèse, antithèse et synthèse, 16 R.D.U.S. 591, 632–33, 642–43 (1986). Mr. 
Justice LeBel, then a member of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, agreed in Produits Pétro-
Canada Inc. v. Moalli, [1987] R.J.Q. 261 at ¶ 25 (Que. Ct. App.) (quoting Morissette, 
supra this note). Domtar and B.C. Telephone first discarded and then rehabilitated to a 
limited extent the view in question. In his reasons in Wilson, Justice Stratas does not 
mention Domtar, but it seems to me that, quite apart from the issue of “unjust” dismissal 
raised by the case, a prior and a significant issue, pertaining specifically to the scope of 
judicial review, must be addressed first in disposing of that appeal. And the question is not 
who has the last say on the meaning of “unjust,” but, rather, under what precise 
circumstances courts are entitled to have the last say in the judicial review of a tribunal’s 
decision. That is the interesting and difficult question, forever reargued in such cases. In 
my view, not all divergences of opinion qualify as inconsistencies. See Société Terminaux 
Montréal Gateway, 2015 QCCA 542 (discussing meanings ascribed to term “essential fact” 
by various decisionmakers). To hold that they do amounts to substituting appeals to 
judicial review.
50. There are obvious historical, institutional, and even policy reasons why deference 
towards reasonable legal interpretations (or decisions) is not a doctrine which should easily 
extend to areas of law unrelated to judicial review and administrative law. In my view, 
however, there are no analytical reasons why this should be so.  
51. ROGER P. KERANS & KIM M. WILLEY, STANDARDS OF REVIEW EMPLOYED BY 
APPELLATE COURTS (2d ed. 2006). Judge Kerans was a member of the Court of Appeal of 
Alberta from 1980 to 1997, and Ms. Willey, a lawyer educated in Canada, is at present 
pursuing the Ph.D. in law at Cambridge. 
52. Kerans and Willey identify five “traditional” standards: (i) absolute deference, 
(ii) unreasonableness, (ii) patent unreasonableness, (iv) correctness (or concurrence), and 
(v) fresh assessment (or trial de novo on the record). Id. at 38–39 (footnote omitted). These 
categories remain useful despite the fact that Dunsmuir, of course, collapsed (ii) and (iii) in 
judicial review. Rather than a standard of review, absolute deference is a complete bar to 
review; the inability of the Crown to appeal fact-based acquittals is perhaps the only 
significant example of this sort of legal restriction on appellate review.
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at work here, namely the distinction between law and fact. 
Before I do so, however, it is worth mentioning that, on appeal, 
there are certain types of first-instance decisions (often 
described as “discretionary”) which attract a perceptible degree 
of deference from appellate courts. The leading commentators 
call this category “guidelines cases”53 and offer as illustrations, 
inter alia,
i. quantum of damages for non-pecuniary loss, 
ii. the custody of children, 
iii. family support, 
iv. interlocutory orders and case-management matters, 
and
v. sentencing.54
This is really an open-ended category and not an outlier 
category. One should not underestimate its scope, for the issue 
may arise whenever the application of a rule actually requires 
the weighing of a range of factors, something which is not 
infrequent. A typical example would be a variation of a custody 
order in a judgment which applies (or more accurately, follows) 
Gordon v. Goetz55 and weighs the seven separate factors listed 
by then-Justice McLachlin in her reasons.56 But the same could 
be said of many other judgments: for example, rulings on 
oppression remedies under section 241 of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act57 or rulings on a debtor-protection order under 
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.58 The rationale for 
53. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51, at 207–47. The category of guideline cases 
divides roughly into two sub-groups: “the first are those cases involving the management 
of the trial and some aspects of the pre-trial process; the second are those where the rule of 
law governing the case makes many factors relevant, and requires the decision-maker to 
weigh and balance them.” Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 229–49. 
55. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27. 
56. Id. at ¶ 49. 
57. R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44 § 241(3) (May 2017) (indicating that court “may make any 
final or interim order that it thinks fit” and referring to more than ten possible orders). 
58. R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-36 § 49(1) (May 2017) (indicating that the court may, if 
“satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the debtor company’s property or the 
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B      11/15/2017   09:50:50
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B      11/15/2017   09:50:50
MORISSETTEEXECEDITMACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2017 6:49 PM
72 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
deference here is based, at least in part but sensibly enough, on 
the coexistence of several possible, equally valid, and perhaps 
even contradictory outcomes to the decisionmaking process.59
B. The Fundamental Distinctions Between Fact and Law 
Over the last decade or so, the Supreme Court of Canada 
rendered a series of judgments which hinge on this distinction. It 
is easy to set out in general terms what they stand for. They 
repeatedly underscored the nature of the standard of review on 
questions of fact. As a result of Housen v. Nicholaisen60 and 
H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General),61 but pursuant also to a 
judge-made rule that came into existence much earlier,62 it is 
now indisputable in Canadian positive law that, on question of 
fact, or on mixed questions of fact and law, the standard of 
review on appeal will justify a reversal only in the presence of a 
“palpable and overriding error.” Naturally, there is room for 
discussion on what amounts to a palpable and overriding error, 
and there can be vigorous debates on what is, and what is not, a 
question of law, or a question of fact, or a mixed question of law 
and fact, and so on. Before I consider these complications, I will 
say a few words on what appears to be at this time the lay of the 
interests of a creditor or creditors, make any order that it considers appropriate” and 
referring to more than ten possible orders). 
59. On this aspect, see Béton Brunet c. Syndicat canadien des communications, de 
l’énergie et du papier, section locale 700 (SCEP), 2015 QCCA 188 (Que. Ct. App.), at  
¶¶ 40–42, where I stressed that very point. 
60. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC 33 at ¶ 1, 3–6 (opining that it should be 
“unnecessary” to state the rule that “a court of appeal should not interfere with a trial 
judge’s reasons unless there is a palpable and overriding error,” and discussing meaning 
and application of standard expressed in that phrase).  
61. [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25 at ¶ 9 (recognizing Housen rule that “findings of 
fact by the trial judge will be disturbed on appeal only for errors that can properly be 
characterized as palpable and overriding”).  
62. It appears that we owe the precise formulation (“palpable and overriding error”) to 
Justice Ritchie in Stein v. The Ship “Kathy K,” [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802. These same words are 
nowhere to be found in the Supreme Court of Canada databases prior to 1976. But, citing 
decisions that went as far back as 1880, Justice Ritchie wrote in Stein that “[t]hese 
authorities are not to be taken as meaning that the findings of fact made at trial are 
immutable, but rather that they are not to be reversed unless it can be established that the 
learned trial judge made some palpable and overriding error which affected his assessment 
of the facts.” Id. at ¶ 7. He may have had a sharp pen but the idea was not new. 
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land with respect to these different standards of review. This is 
not complicated.63
On appeal, the standard of review for questions of fact and 
mixed questions of fact and law is palpable and overriding error. 
That is true of all questions of fact, not only in civil but also 
(and surprisingly64) in criminal proceedings. So, in essence, and 
subject to the often unpredictable exception of the guidelines 
cases mentioned above, there are two standards of review on 
appeal: palpable and overriding error and mere error. The former 
applies to anything other than a question of law, and the latter to 
any question of law. I will return below to palpable and 
overriding errors but first I will add a few words of clarification 
about the standard of mere error. That standard and the standard 
of correctness are the same. What they mean for a judge 
exercising appellate review is crystal clear: they mean “I get to 
decide, period.” The standard of correctness (or error) has been 
described as a “concurrence” standard, which is both true and 
commendably tactful.65 I use a blunter formulation because I 
63. Judge Posner has noted that “review of purely legal findings is plenary, and of 
factual findings (and application of law to fact) deferential in the sense of giving respectful 
consideration to the determination by the lower court,” and that “[t]here is a little more to 
standards of review, but not much.” POSNER, supra note 33, at 84. These words could 
apply here. 
64. See R v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, 2002 SCC 12, ¶ 117, 118; R v. Oickle, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 38, ¶ 71; see generally R v. Babos, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, 2014 SCC 
16; R v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26; R v. Clark, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6, 2005 
SCC 2. I say “surprisingly” for epistemic reasons: The presumption of innocence and the 
burden of proof in criminal trials are tied to a reasonable doubt, and palpable and 
overriding error on appeal raising questions of fact seems a detrimental alteration of what 
an accused person is entitled to expect from the judicial system. On the other hand, once it 
is conceded that, for a host of institutional reasons, the trier of fact is not to be reversed in 
the absence of an obvious mistake, the extension of the standard to criminal cases appears 
defensible. Otherwise, perpetual retrials on appeal would become the norm, if only for 
appellants who can afford the process, which is not a better form of criminal justice. 
65. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51, at 39. The  authors explain that 
[t]he First Edition of this work argued for the preference of the term 
“concurrence” in reflection of the fact that it is arrogant for a higher court to 
presume that its interpretation is necessarily correct. Canadian appellate courts 
have ignored this advice. However, for the purposes of consistency with the 
terminology of the Supreme Court of Canada, we will reluctantly use the term 
“correctness” to refer to this least deferential standard of review, but only in 
association with the preferred expression “concurrence.” 
Id. at n.7. I entirely agree with them.
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believe that, regardless of the level at which review occurs, there 
is a virtue in exposing appellate arrogance for what it is. 
I am not suggesting here that “I get to decide, period” is a 
synonym for “I get my way, no matter what.” Of course not: 
judges are constrained by the law, but they are constrained by 
the law as they honestly understand it to be. There is a subject/
object difficulty at work here. One would have to be naïve 
indeed to think that the law’s meaning, especially in the litigious 
surroundings where judges live and work, is always as perfectly 
plain, and as certain in outcome, as is the formal (but 
deceptively certain) formula 2 + 2 = 4. (Indeed, but what 2s? 
What is behind the formal symbol?) So “I get to decide, period” 
is not a complete license to do as one pleases. It is only the 
freedom to let one’s interpretive preference prevail, and only for 
the time being. This, in the last analysis, and for most of us 
judges, means subject to the interpretive preferences of five of 
the nine highest judicial decisionmakers in the land. Unless, of 
course, no matter of national importance is at stake, there is no 
constitutional issue involved, and Parliament or the relevant 
legislature chooses not to get in the way, and so on. Such are the 
thoughts that legal realism inspires. Plato would likely be 
underwhelmed by all this prattle. 
Turning now to the standard of review for questions of fact, 
or mixed questions of fact and law, we know from the caselaw 
that it is “palpable and overriding error.” As I suggested earlier, 
there are two difficulties here: (i) what qualifies as a question of 
law, and (ii) what qualifies as a “palpable and overriding” error. 
I will now examine these two questions in turn. 
C. Identifying Questions of Law 
The distinction between questions of fact and questions of 
law is of considerable importance on appeal. In many cases 
heard in the court where I serve, counsel will pay surprisingly 
little attention to it. All too often, the distinction is overlooked, 
instrumentalised, or greatly distorted. When it is not overlooked, 
it frequently becomes itself a matter of debate, which most of 
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the time amounts to a dialogue of the deaf.66 Yet there is no 
shortage of good scholarship on the topic.67 For my part, the two 
most enlightening law review articles I have found are by 
Professors Allen and Pardo68 and by Professor Endicott.69 The 
views I express here closely follow, I believe, the argument 
developed by Professor Endicott, whose opinion I share.70
I begin by saying that some questions, of course, are 
undoubtedly questions of law (for example, does a recent 
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure apply retroactively?) 
and that some questions are just as assuredly questions of fact 
(for example, was John Smith in Ottawa on June 6, 2014?). That 
is not where the problem lies. The problem arises where we are 
confronted with what is usually called a “mixed question of law 
and fact,” a notion I find inherently misleading. When the 
analysis is carried through as it should be, we almost always end 
up with questions of law or questions of fact. 
66. Many lawyers, of course, can distinguish, in an intuitive way, questions of law from 
questions of fact. Regrettably, however, many also cannot, or simply will not if it may 
operate detrimentally to their client’s interest. Thus, in Canada (Director of Investigation 
& Research, Competition Act) v. Southam, Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, Justice Iacobucci 
noted that “[t]he parties vigorously dispute the nature of the problem before the Tribunal. 
The appellants say that the problem is one of fact. The respondent insists that the problem 
is one of law. In my view, the problem is one of mixed law and fact.” Id. at ¶ 34. It seems 
rather strange that such a debate was still ongoing at that level of court. With such 
inclinations to argue come what may, how could these counsel be sure that they had 
graduated from a law school, as opposed to a “fact school”? In that sense, what the 
Supreme Court of Canada explains, painstakingly, in cases such as Housen, 2002 SCC 33, 
at ¶¶ 27–36, about the extricable nature of questions of law, is fundamental to 
understanding what appeals are for.  
67. See generally, e.g., Daniel Jutras, The Narrowing Scope of Appellate Review: Has 
the Pendulum Swung Too Far? 32 MAN. L.J. 61 (2016); Frédéric Bachand, Le traitement 
en appel des questions de fait, questions de droit et questions mixtes, 86 CAN. BAR REV. 97 
(2007); A.L. Goodhart, Appeals on Questions of Fact, 71 L.Q. REV. 402 (1955); Walter 
Wheeler Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact’, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1937); Jabez Fox, 
Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1899). 
68. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1769 (2003). Professor Allen is one of the editors of Wigmore’s treatise and an 
evidence scholar. Professor Pardo of the University of Alabama, also an evidence scholar, 
is among Professor Allen’s frequent co-authors. The view expressed in this stimulating 
article is very much a contrarian one.  
69. Timothy A.O. Endicott, Questions of Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 292 (1998). Professor 
Endicott, who is Canadian, is a former Dean of Law at the University of Oxford.  
70. For a full discussion of the two conflicting theses of these three authors and a more 
detailed analysis of the problem, see the Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 520–30.  
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My own view of the matter is simple. I believe, first, that in 
any dispute between A and B, one has to distinguish between the 
question presented for decision on its merit, let us call it Y, and 
a prior question of characterisation as to whether Y is a question 
of law or a question of fact, let us call that prior question X. The 
answer to question X (Is Y a question of law or of fact?) 
depends on Y’s potential to attract an answer that has a 
normative reach beyond the dispute between A and B. In other 
words, and to put it plainly, if, because of the reasons you offer 
in support of your ruling, you rule not just on the dispute 
between A and B, but also on other disputes, whether actual or 
potential, the normative reach of the answer you are giving to 
question Y entails that you are deciding a question of law. 
Indeed, you may stand up and salute: you are making law, 
though only interstitially.71 It is trite to say that juries never 
decide questions of law. In point of fact, where jury nullification 
is tolerated, juries decide questions of law, even though they do 
so simply by ignoring a law they find objectionable. Where, 
however, jury nullification is not tolerated, as in Canada, the 
reason juries never decide questions of law is that they only 
render verdicts and they never give reasons.72 I have offered as a 
practical illustration of this line of reasoning73 a rather 
entertaining little case74 which three of my colleagues decided 
71. Here comes Holmes again. As is I think very well known, Justice Holmes wrote that 
he “recognize[d] without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so 
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common law 
judge could not say ‘I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and 
shall not enforce it in my court.’” S. Pac. Co v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). In so doing, “he of course rejected the classical or purely declaratory theory 
of the judicial function.” Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in 
Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 33 (1955).  
72. A rather vivid illustration of the problem can be found, albeit only indirectly, in R v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, ¶¶ 65–68. The scorching comments aimed at counsel by 
Chief Justice Dickson in that opinion were also a denunciation of a forensic tactic which 
amounted to an incitement to jury nullification. The acquittals in that memorable case were 
restored by the Supreme Court of Canada on constitutional grounds. The jury, which had 
returned verdicts of not guilty in the first place, had done so, of course, without reasons. 
Had it been required to give reasons, it is at least plausible, given the tenor of counsel for 
the defence’s closing speech that the jury would have deliberately derogated from the law 
then thought to be in force. 
73. Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 528–30. 
74.  Paradis v. R, 2007 QCCA 281 (Que. Ct. App.); Paradis v. R, No. 450-36-000515-
040, 2004 CanLII 49126 (Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2004); R. v.  Paradis, No. 450-01-031282-
036, 2004 CanLII 3327 (Ct. Que. July 7, 2004). Until the case reached the Court of Appeal, 
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after I had granted leave to appeal, on “a question of law alone,” 
as required by the Criminal Code. 
When seen in this light, the problem of characterization 
(i.e. question X, above) is much less troubling than it is 
customarily thought to be. There are sound reasons of legal 
policy for approaching the problem in this manner, reasons 
which Justice Rothstein sets out in the recent Supreme Court 
judgment in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.75 By 
itself, the interpretation of a contract is a question of fact, 
something which is well accepted in civil law countries and 
which is the only sensible answer to the question of 
characterization. It seemed self-evident to the leading 
commentators76 and I entirely agree with them. 
What Sattva decided has long been the law in France, 
where the supreme judicial court, the Cour de cassation, does 
no one, including judges and counsel, had noticed a salient fact: the admittedly intoxicated 
driver who had just gotten into the car was sitting by mistake in a vehicle identical to his 
own but belonging to another person. Paradis, 2007 QCCA at ¶ 6 (holding that the failure 
of the judge below to consider evidence indicating that the driver’s own keys would not 
have started the stranger’s car was an error of law that determined the outcome of the case, 
and entering an acquittal).
75. [2014] 2 R.C.S. 633, 2014 SCC 53. Justice Rothstein points out in Sattva that 
[t]he purpose of the distinction between questions of law and those of mixed fact 
and law further supports this conclusion. One central purpose of drawing a 
distinction between questions of law and those of mixed fact and law is to limit 
the intervention of appellate courts to cases where the results can be expected to 
have an impact beyond the parties to the particular dispute. It reflects the role of 
courts of appeal in ensuring the consistency of the law, rather than in providing a 
new forum for parties to continue their private litigation. For this reason, 
Southam . . . identified the degree of generality (or “precedential value”) as the 
key difference between a question of law and a question of mixed fact and law. 
The more narrow the rule, the less useful will be the intervention of the court of 
appeal.
Id. at ¶ 51. 
76. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51. They write that 
[a] curious situation arises about the interpretation of documentary evidence, 
including contracts. Misdirection about the rules of interpretation is of course a 
reviewable legal error. But, the meaning of a document is a matter of fact; the 
first judge seeks to find the true intention of the author or authors. This is often a 
matter of inference from the actual words used. Yet the appellate courts 
regularly substitute their view for that of the trial court. Why should documents 
get this special treatment? The interpretation of documents is, then, an area 
where Canadian reviewing courts, unlike some U.S. courts, have not yet faced 
the logic implicit in their approach to other factual questions. One reviewing 
court, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, has refused to re-try the interpretation 
of documents. 
Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted).
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not entertain pourvois en cassation concerning the interpretation 
of contracts because, as a rule, the Cour de cassation deals only 
with questions of law.77 Interestingly enough, three exceptions 
to this rather strict definition of jurisdiction developed over 
time: they concern “les contrats d’application étendue ou 
répétée,” “les contrats homologués par les pouvoirs publics,”
and “les conventions collectives.”78 The second and third 
exceptions are of limited relevance here because they pertain to 
legal devices that have no clear equivalent in our law (i.e. 
French collective agreements are very different from ours). But 
the first category, which is far from negligible, applies, 
typically, to standard-form contracts and, especially, insurance 
policies. It is therefore unsurprising that the first cases after 
Sattva which softened the impact of this important precedent, 
Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance 
Company79 and MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance 
Company of Canada,80 both involved standard-form insurance 
policies. 
D. Finding “Palpable and Overriding” Errors 
The words palpable and overriding (manifeste et dominante
or manifeste et déterminante in French) convey a nuance of 
intensity; they speak of the degree of obviousness that the error 
must evince in order to warrant review. The court on which I 
serve offered various clarifications of this notion on several 
occasions.81 In the recent Vidéotron, s.e.n.c. c. Bell ExpressVu, 
77. The matter is elegantly explained in a standard treatise on cassation. See JACQUES
BORÉ & LOUIS BORÉ, LA CASSATION EN MATIÈRE CIVILE, 275–80 (4th ed. 2008). 
Evidently, the characterization of a contract—as one of employment or one of agency—
often will qualify as a question of law. 
78. Id. at 280–84. 
79. 2015 ABCA 121 (Alta. Ct. App.), at ¶¶ 15–18, (holding that the interpretation of a 
standard-form insurance contract is reviewable on a standard of correctness), rev’d 2016 
SCC 27 (holding that the interpretation of a standard-form insurance contract is an 
exception to the Sattva rule, that the appropriate standard of review in this case was 
correctness, but that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation was incorrect). 
80. 2015 ONCA 842 (Ont. Ct. App.), at ¶¶ 35, 37, 41 (holding that the interpretation of 
a standard-form insurance contract is reviewable on a standard of correctness), motion for 
leave to appeal to S. Ct. of Can. dismissed (No. 36830, Oct. 20, 2016). 
81. See, e.g., P.L. c. Benchetrit, [2010] R.J.Q. 1853, 2010 QCCA 1505 (Que. Ct. App.); 
Regroupement des CHSLD Christ-Roi (Centre hospitalier, soins de longue durée) c. 
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l.p.,82 we were faced with a judgment in which an experienced 
and respected trial judge, after a trial of fifty-seven days raising 
issues of considerable technical complexity, had disregarded as 
not in evidence 37,675 pages of financial data and statistics used 
by the plaintiff’s experts and admitted by the defendants. As a 
result, we awarded some $83,000,000 of damages (amounting, 
apparently, to over $140,000,000 with interest and costs) to the 
plaintiff, where the judgment of first instance had assessed the 
damage at a little under one million dollars. I am not suggesting 
that only errors of fact of this magnitude warrant review, but this 
is nevertheless a good example of palpable and overriding error. 
I was a member of the panel which heard Vidéotron (for 
two full days) and the argument on the existence of a palpable 
and overriding error took only a few minutes. That in itself is 
always very telling: How much time and effort is needed to 
identify the error? An easy-to-identify error is likely to meet the 
standard. That is what is meant by being “able to ‘put one’s 
finger on’ the crucial flaw, fallacy or mistake,” the expression 
used by Justice Fish in H.L.83 More recently, in Canada v. South
Yukon Forest Corporation,84 Justice Stratas of the Federal Court 
of Appeal (whose language I quote at length because I think, 
respectfully, that his analysis is impeccable) had this to say on 
the topic after noting that “the parties had a fundamentally 
different understanding of the meaning of palpable and 
overriding error” in that “long and complex case,” and 
acknowledging that the standard is “highly deferential”85:
In applying the concept of palpable and overriding error, it 
is useful to keep front of mind the reasons why it is an 
appropriate standard in a complex case such as this. 
In this case, there were 40 days of trial stretched out over 6 
months, with 19 witnesses and over 1,000 documents, 
many of which were intricate and technical. In clear and 
Comité provincial des malades, [2007] R.J.Q. 1753, 2007 QCCA 1068 (Que. Ct. App.). 
Benchetrit was quoted and followed by the Court of Appeal of Quebec seventeen times and 
referred to in other judgments of the Court 106 times, while Christ-Roi was quoted and 
followed twenty-two times by the Court of Appeal of Quebec and referred to in other 
judgments of the Court eighty-one times. 
82. 2015 QCCA 422 (Que. Ct. App.). 
83. 2005 SCC 25 at ¶ 70. 
84. 2012 FCA 165. 
85. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44, 46. 
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thorough reasons showing considerable synthesis and 
assessment of the complex evidence before her, the Federal 
Court judge made key findings of fact. Some of these were 
founded upon her assessment, clearly expressed, of the 
credibility of the witnesses before her. Her credibility 
findings concerning most of the Department’s officials who 
testified are quite negative. 
Immersed from day-to-day and week-to-week in a long and 
complex trial such as this, trial judges occupy a privileged 
and unique position. Armed with the tools of logic and 
reason, they study and observe all of the witnesses and the 
exhibits. Over time, factual assessments develop, evolve, 
and ultimately solidify into a factual narrative, full of 
complex interconnections, nuances and flavour. 
. . . 
In this Court, the Crown submitted that a number of the 
Federal Court’s findings of fact should be set aside on the 
basis of palpable and overriding error. 
In my view, the Crown failed to establish palpable and 
overriding error as it has been articulated above. The 
Federal Court judge had a basis in the record for her key 
factual findings. The Crown views the basis for some of 
them expressed in the reasons as being rather thin. In some 
regards that may be so but, as I have explained, thinness 
alone is not palpable and overriding error. 
Therefore, in this appeal, I shall proceed on the basis that 
every one of the Federal Court’s findings of fact must 
stand.86
The failure of counsel to heed the warnings of appellate 
judges confronted with bulky records and convoluted or opaque 
issues of fact probably accounts for the robustness of the 
metaphors with which these judges reiterate the simple point 
made in Housen and in H.L. Yet it should be self-evident by 
now that a palpable and overriding error is not in the nature of 
the proverbial needle in a haystack (une aiguille dans une botte 
de foin) but is instead in the nature of the biblical beam in the 
eye (une poutre dans l’oeil).87 Enough said. 
86. Id. ¶¶ 47–49, 52–54. 
87. See J.G. c. Nadeau, 2016 QCCA 167 (Que. Ct. App.), at ¶ 77 (opining that “erreur 
manifeste et dominante tient, non pas de l’aiguille dans une botte de foin, mais de la poutre 
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E. The Incidence of Institutional Constraints 
on Reviewing Practices 
There are also external reasons to be selective in exercising 
appellate jurisdiction, reasons which are unrelated to the tenor of 
legal issues arising in particular cases, or which have only a very 
loose connection with the substance of those cases. 
One such reason is the steadily increasing number of 
querulous or vexatious litigants who lodge appeals as of right or 
who systematically seek leave to appeal where leave is needed.88
That is a topic in itself and one for another day. But I will 
mention in passing that in several appellate courts I know, there 
are procedural safeguards available today, which did not exist 
ten or twenty years ago, to prevent such litigants from 
squandering the time and energy of the judges and court 
personnel. Devices such as Rule 2.1 of the Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which came into force in 2014, are now needed 
to contain those types of situations.89 And we see here and there 
dans l’oeil”); see generally id. ¶¶ 75–79 (discussing palpable and overriding error), ¶¶ 128–
30 (noting that the appellate record disclosed primarily questions of fact and suggesting 
that counsel took too aggressive an approach in criticizing the actions of the judge below in 
an attempt to establish the existence of palpable and overriding error where there was 
none), motion for leave to appeal to S. Ct. of Can. dismissed sub nom Grondin v. Nadeau, 
2017 Carswell Que. 958 (S.C.C. Mar. 2, 2017) (dismissing application in light of Benhaim 
v. St-Germain, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352, 2016 SCC 48). 
In Benhaim, a majority of five members of the Supreme Court of Canada adopted 
the needle-in-a-haystack/beam-in-the-eye formulation, Benhaim at ¶ 39, and, in the absence 
in that case of any palpable and overriding error of fact, dismissed the appeal. The two 
Benhaim dissenters found no fewer than three palpable and overriding errors on the part of 
the trial judge, id. ¶ 103 (opining that trial judge had “misconstrue[ed]” certain testimony, 
“omitted” certain evidence, and “erred” in the “inference-drawing process itself”), errors 
which had escaped the notice of the Court of Appeal. . . . It sometimes feels as if we are 
running around in circles. 
88. A judgment rendered by a panel I was part of on December 9, 2015, provides a 
spectacular and sorry illustration of what I am describing here. See In re Poplawski, 2015 
QCCA 2054 (Que. Ct. App.). 
89. See generally Ont. R. Civ. P. 2.1 (addressing courts’ power to stay or dismiss 
frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings and motions); see also, e.g., Gao v. Ont. 
(Workplace Safety & Ins. Bd.), 2014 ONSC 6497 (Ont. Super. Ct.). Justice Myers 
observed in Gao that 
[e]xperience teaches that vexatious litigant proceedings can be very expensive 
and often serve just to give a vexatious party yet another opportunity to inflict 
the very harms that the process is designed to end. To obtain a vexatious litigant 
order, an applicant must commence a separate proceeding and prove that the 
target has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious 
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in the caselaw an innovative use of inherent powers to prevent 
abuses of the appellate process by such litigants.90
The growing complexity of trials and appeals also warrants 
case-management measures which may restrict the room for 
manoeuvre of parties exercising their right of appeal. Large class 
actions come to mind here, and I can provide a specific example. 
I recently heard, with four colleagues, and over a period of six 
days, an appeal from a Superior Court judgment delivered on 
June 9, 2015.91 This judgment, after a trial of 251 days, awarded 
some thirteen billion dollars to plaintiffs who sued several 
cigarette manufacturers for selling a toxic product. We were 
initially told that the record on appeal exceeded 257,000 pages, 
but, as a result of deft case management in the Court of Appeal, 
the record was pared down to 203,000 pages before it came to 
us. The parties had identified before the hearing thirty-eight 
common questions, and nineteen additional questions of interest 
to only one of the appellants, for a total of fifty-seven.92 It 
should be obvious that streamlining is de rigueur in litigation of 
proceedings or has conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. The 
requirement to show persistence has meant that litigants must endure several 
vexatious proceedings prior to bringing a vexatious litigant proceeding. While 
courts have recognized that vexatious litigants can inflict substantial costs on the 
opposing parties and significant systemic costs, the harm is amplified by the 
need to endure multiple frivolous proceedings before section 140 [of the Courts
of Justice Act] applies. Moreover, an application for a vexatious litigant 
declaration is a separate legal proceeding. This gives the vexatious litigant a 
platform from which to repeat all of her or his vexatious conduct. The 
respondent in a vexatious litigant proceeding has all of the rights of a respondent 
to a regular application—i.e. to file evidence, to cross-examine, to summon third 
party witnesses, to bring motions, and, especially exhausting and expensive, the 
right to or to seek leave to appeal at every step of the way. In virtually all of 
these cases the respondents are impecunious and will not be able to pay the costs 
awards that they invariably rack up along the way to being declared vexatious 
litigants.  
Id. ¶ 8.  
90. See, e.g., Chutskoff Estate v. Bonora, 2014 ABCA 444 (Alta. Ct. App.). Justice 
Slatter, sitting alone as a motions judge in Chutskoff Estate, dismissed three applications 
for leave to appeal brought by a vexatious litigant and included these words in the 
conclusion to his opinion: “This decision is final, and no application to reopen it will be 
entertained. Any attempt to continue to litigate the issues resolved here, in any form and 
under any pretext, will be treated as a contempt of court.” Id. ¶ 19. 
91. Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 QCCS 2382 (Que. Super. Ct.). 
92. And this is only part of the story. In addition to these questions, which all pertain to 
the final judgment, several interlocutory judgments on the admissibility of evidence which 
could not be appealed at the time because they were being rendered during the trial, were 
also challenged by the appellants. 
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this complexity and that appellate judges cannot be expected to 
review the entire record in order to form a view of the facts. 
Picking gnats with tweezers definitely is not an option here. The 
Housen rule, which directs appellate courts to assess claims of 
error using the palpable and overriding standard, comes in handy 
in this type of case. 
Lastly, I must say a word or two of external and 
institutional pressures on appellate courts. What I will describe 
here is definitely more apparent in the federal courts of appeals 
in the United States than in Canadian courts but we can detect in 
Canada, at least in some appellate courts, tendencies that 
resemble those which are now increasingly conspicuous in the 
United States. One such indication is the growth in the number 
of law clerks and staff lawyers in the Supreme Court of Canada 
between 1980 and today. 
The principal cause of this state of affairs below the border 
appears easy to identify: it is the size of the federal appellate 
judiciary relative its caseload.93  Between 1960 and 2010, the 
average number of appeals filed per judge of the federal courts 
of appeals each year increased from not quite sixty to almost 
350. I do not think that we face this problem here—the number 
of federally appointed judges in Canada appears to be 
commensurate with the task at hand. 
But other background factors also aggravate the pressure on 
appellate courts. The increasing complexity of the docket, 
notably because of mammoth class actions and complex civil-
93. Professors Richman and Reynolds, who speak of a caseload explosion, offer the 
following statistics on the evolution of federal appellate caseloads in the United States. 
Year Appeals Filed Judges Average per Judge 
1960 3,899 68 57.3 
1970 11,662 97 120.2 
1980 23,200 132 175.8 
1990 40,898 167 244.9 
2000 54,697 167 327.5 
2010 56,790 167 340.1 
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 8 (2013). One solution would be to increase the 
size of the appellate judiciary from the current 179 judges (a figure that includes some 
visiting and senior-status judges) to a membership of 342. Id. at 170. That is an increase of 
roughly ninety-two percent, which does not appear a likely scenario. 
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rights actions,94 is one such factor. Charter litigation, class 
actions such as Létourneau,95 and mega criminal trials (e.g., in 
Quebec, the Hells Angels cases96), arguably amount to a parallel 
trend in Canada. 
Some knowledgeable observers detect a marked 
deterioration in the traditional high quality of appellate justice in 
the federal courts of appeals. They blame it primarily on the 
persistent refusal of the U.S. Congress to increase the size of the 
federal judiciary in a manner commensurate with the growth of 
its caseload.97 Another troubling factor is the equally persistent 
refusal of Congress to address the issue of diminishing judicial 
remuneration.98 The empirical foundation of this claim remains 
a matter of debate among academics and the issues are 
complex.99 Canadian judges continue to be spared many of these 
annoyances. But in the United States, with such numbers, 
94. By way of example, between 1961 and 1979, as a result of two United States 
Supreme Court cases, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the number of 
habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners in the federal courts of appeals increased by 
“roughly 1700 percent.” See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 11 (1981).   
95. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92, supra.
96. See, e.g., R. v. Stadnick, 2009 QCCA 1574 (Que. Ct. App.). 
97. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 165–72.
98. More than a decade ago, Chief Justice Roberts warned against the pernicious effects 
of this state of affairs on the recruitment of a diverse and well-qualified judiciary. John G. 
Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 1, Supreme Court of the 
United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 
2006year-endreport.pdf (referring to Congressional failure to raise salaries for federal 
judges as “a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and independence 
of the federal judiciary”); see also id. passim (expounding on this topic, which was the 
single focus of the 2006 Report).
99. See, e.g., Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More? 88 B.U. L.
REV. 63 (2008) (ultimately disputing on empirical grounds the claim (or assumption) that 
better pay will improve judicial performance); Christopher Zorn, William D. Henderson & 
Jason J. Czarnezki, Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. REV. 829 (2008) (concluding that the 
behavior of federal judges appointed from the country’s top five legal markets differs from 
that of federal judges appointed from smaller markets, in which law-firm partners make 
less than do law-firm partners in top legal markets); Scott Baker, Refining the Judicial 
Salary/Judicial Performance Debate: A Response to Professors Cross, Czarnezki, 
Henderson, Marks, and Zorn, 88 B.U. L. REV. 855 (2008) (acknowledging other scholars’ 
reactions to results of study reported in Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More? and 
encouraging more empirical research). 
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something had to give, and it did. Many of these changes 
occurred in the last four decades: 
i. very short hearings (something still quite alien to 
English lawyers and judges,100 though not quite so 
alien for Canadian judges), 
ii. disposals with no hearing at all (overall in the 
twelve federal courts of appeals, the average 
percentage of merit terminations after an oral 
hearing is eighteen percent),101
iii. disposals without reasons in unpublished decisions, 
100. Let us remember here Anisminic, that famous 1969 case, argued for twelve days 
(three weeks) in the Court of Appeal, and for twelve additional days (three weeks again) in 
the House of Lords. Lengthy hearings of this kind were once the rule, not the exception: 
Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd.  (No 2), [1966] All E.R. 536 (H.L.), was heard 
for twenty-one days. As late as 1989, the House of Lords heard oral arguments for twenty-
six days in Maclaine Watson & Company Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1990] 
2 A.C. 418, a case that appears to have been relatively straightforward and in which the 
performance of counsel prompted the following remarks by Lord Templeman, whose 
opinion (or “speech”) was itself decidedly straightforward: 
For the conduct of these appeals, there were locked in battle 24 counsel 
supported by batteries of solicitors and legal experts, armed with copies of 200 
authorities and 14 volumes of extracts, British and foreign, from legislation, 
books and articles. Ten counsel addressed the Appellate Committee for 26 days. 
This vast amount of written and oral material tended to obscure three 
fundamental principles—that the capacities of a body corporate include the 
capacity to contract, that no one is liable on a contract save the parties to the 
contract and that treaty rights and obligations are not enforceable in the courts of 
the United Kingdom unless incorporated into law by statute. In my opinion the 
length of oral argument permitted in future appeals should be subject to prior 
limitation by the Appellate Committee. 
Id. at 483. By contrast, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519 (2012), the challenge to Obamacare, took up a grand total of six hours, spread over 
three days. See Tr. of Oral Arg., Fla. v. Dept. of HHS, 2012 WL 1031485 (Mar. 28, 2012) 
(No. 11-400); Tr. of Oral Arg., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 2012 WL 1031484 
(Mar. 28, 2012) (Nos.11-393 & 11-400); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL 
1017220 (Mar. 27, 2012) (No. 11-398); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL 
993811 (Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-398); see also Order Pertaining to the Allocation of Oral 
Arg. Time, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, Feb. 21, 2012, Nos. 11-393, 
11-398, & 11-400 (allocating six hours of argument time among counsel for parties and 
amici).
101. POSNER, supra note 33, at 233. 
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iv. no-citation rules while they lasted,102
v. multiplication of law clerks (federal appellate 
judges have a choice between five law clerks or four 
law clerks and an assistant),103 and 
vi. exponential growth of the cadre of central staff 
attorneys.104
These are all signs of a Weberian bureaucratization of the 
federal appellate system, a process which Professors Richman 
and Reynolds deplore.105 One problematic effect of this 
transformation in the practice of appellate judging is that very 
few judges actually write their judgments. Judge Posner, again, 
writes with commendable frankness in his book: “[T]he number 
of federal judges who write their own opinions, as distinct from 
editing (sometimes quite lightly) law clerks’ opinion drafts, can 
probably be numbered on the fingers of two hands.”106 Since by 
his count in 2016, there are 187 circuit judges, this observation 
entails that 177 of them farm out, as it were, the writing of their 
judgments, or merely edit what comes along after stating their 
preferences to their clerks. 
Professors Richman and Reynolds argue that a return to the 
“Learned Hand treatment” is essential if the federal judiciary is 
to retain its constitutional legitimacy in the United States. A 
laudable thought but I suspect that they are not about to get 
satisfaction.
102. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 75–80. 
103. POSNER, supra note 33, at 68. 
104. Professors Richman and Reynolds document this trend and estimate at “about 500 
staff attorneys” the size of the cohort at the time of publication in 2013. RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 112. That means an average of forty-one attorneys per 
circuit. 
105. See generally id.
106. POSNER, supra note 33, at 4. He adds that “[n]o one doubts that the judge is in 
charge; that’s not the issue; the issue is who should be the opinion writer. I know for 
certain of only three federal court of appeals judges besides myself who write all their own 
drafts. I imagine that there are a few others; and I know that there are judges who write at 
least some of their first drafts.” Id. at 223. It can be supposed that, having been appointed 
to the Seventh Circuit in 1981, having been chief judge of that circuit from 1993 to 2000, 
and remaining a member of the same court in 2016 at the age of 76, Judge Posner likely 
knows what he is talking about.
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*  *  * 
Law never stands still for very long. Not surprisingly, 
appellate standards of review in Anglo-American legal systems 
have evolved a great deal through the ages. At different times, 
they reflected different understandings of law and of legal 
reasoning—those that prevailed in the climate of the day. One 
thus detects a degree of porosity in these standards, a form of 
osmosis with their environment, intellectual and normative. 
Currently, we live in an era of realism or pragmatism about law. 
We must accept that, in the words of a prominent American 
jurist and judge, law is “not a science or even a social 
science.”107 We know it to be a discipline firmly rooted in reality 
which values a thorough and rigorous analysis of all relevant 
facts and which responds well to prudential considerations. 
The point of appeals in this context is not to hunt down 
with passionate intensity all forensic claims of alleged error. The 
standards of appellate review as they exist today strike a delicate 
balance between promoting the systemic coherence of the law in 
force here and now, and exercising an appropriate measure of 
quality control over the many judgments and decisions of courts 
of first instance and tribunals. It is also a fragile balance because 
it can be upset by institutional and other pressures on the 
appellate process. Vigilance is therefore needed to ensure the 
integrity of this process. Without it, the rule of law is weakened 
and perhaps meaningfully curtailed. 
107. Id. at 227.
